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Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis
Abstract
This article examines the current state of professionalism in national security intelligence
analysis in the U.S. Government. Since the introduction of major intelligence reforms
directed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December,
2004, we have seen notable strides in many aspects of intelligence professionalization,
including in analysis. But progress is halting, uneven, and by no means permanent. To
consolidate its gains, and if it is to continue improving, the U.S. intelligence community (IC)
should commit itself to accomplishing a new program of further professionalization of
analysis to ensure that it will develop an analytic cadre that is fully prepared to deal with
the complexities of an emerging multipolar and highly dynamic world that the IC itself is
forecasting. Some recent reforms in intelligence analysis can be assessed against
established standards of more fully developed professions; these may well fall short of
moving the IC closer to the more fully professionalized analytical capability required for
producing the kind of analysis needed now by the United States.
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Introduction1
Since the introduction of major intelligence reforms directed by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December,
2004, we have seen notable strides in many aspects of intelligence
professionalization, including analysis. But progress is halting, uneven, and
by no means permanent. To consolidate its gains—and if it is to continue
improving—the U.S. intelligence community (IC) should commit itself to
accomplishing a new program of further professionalization of analysis.
While the progress made in the decade since the passage of IRTPA is notably
encouraging, we believe it will fall well short of developing the kind of analytic
cadre that will be needed to deal with the complexities of an emerging
multipolar and highly dynamic world that the IC anticipates it will be facing.2
When recent reforms in intelligence analysis are assessed against established
standards of more fully developed professions, it is clear that a fully
professionalized analysis capability remains a distant goal. This article
assesses U.S. intelligence analysis as a nascent profession against other more
fully developed professions. It argues for an intensified and sustained effort
to emulate key criteria and rigorous standards that have proven effective in
the professionalization of other disciplines. While the focus here is on
intelligence analysis for national security, some aspects are also relevant to
analysis in law enforcement, competitive intelligence for the private sector,
and possibly for other nations whose intelligence services operate similarly to
those in the United States.
Professionalization of analysis, toward which many practitioners have spent
the past decade working, has become a major contributor to both the quality
and utility of analysis. Signs of progress can be seen in nearly all the major
characteristics of what constitutes a true discipline. There have been
impressive strides in analytic tradecraft (the methodology of intelligence
The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of
the Central Intelligence Agency or any other U.S. Government organization. This article
has been reviewed by the CIA’s Publication Review Board to ensure it contains no
classified information. The authors thank the Journal’s anonymous reviewers for their
for their incisive and constructive critiques that much improved this submission. This
article is based on conclusions reached in Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (eds.),
Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners Perspectives, 2nd ed.,
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univesrsity Press, 2014), especially chapter 20.
2 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington,
D.C.: Director of National Intelligence, December 2012).
1
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analysis), intelligence training and education, community-wide knowledge
management, and analytic standards. Indeed, professionalization is
continuing and perhaps even accelerating in some areas. Although this
progress remains uneven across the U.S. intelligence community, recent
milestones are real pace-setters:


The National Intelligence University (NIU)—once only a virtual one—
is now a bricks-and-mortar institution operated by the Defense
Intelligence Agency. Shortly moving to Bethesda, Maryland with plans
for program expansion, NIU has incorporated a variety of accredited
degree programs previously offered by the National Defense
Intelligence College.3



Until recently, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) has offered sound introductory intelligence analysis training
to analysts across the community. This has been particularly
important for standardizing analytic tradecraft and standards across
the IC, and for smaller and more resource-limited agencies not able to
provide it for themselves. (IC-sponsored analyst training has recently
suffered cutbacks due to budget pressures).



The creation of the I-Space has facilitated collaboration and the
Library of National Intelligence (LNI) has begun the cataloguing,
sharing, and retrieval of intelligence-based information.4



Some agencies have begun advanced intelligence tradecraft training
and specialization, which in some cases suggests a step toward
certifying analysts as being eligible to enter a more selective group of
senior analysts whose skills have been demonstrated as fully
proficient.



The development of specific standards for analyst competencies in
core, tradecraft, and subject matter expertise is recently underway

A brief summary of NIU and major agencies’ analyst training programs is found in
Mark M. Lowenthal, “The Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts,” in George
and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2014), pp. 305-306.
4 See Thomas Fingar, “Building a Community of Analysts,” in George and Bruce (eds),
Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, chapter 17, for a survey of recent DNI-driven
accomplishments in IC analysis.
3
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within the ODNI, DIA, and the law enforcement community, an
important prerequisite to anticipated analyst certification.5
As the intelligence community has moved forward with such reforms, the
debate over the meaning and significance of “professionalization” has
progressed as well. Scholars such as Stephen Marrin have articulated that
practitioners of intelligence analysis have not moved quickly enough to adopt
needed characteristics of the legal or medical professions. Moreover, he
rightly laments the gap between these practitioners and intelligence studies
scholars, which prevents practicing analysts from learning from the hard-won
lessons gleaned from serious historical study of past intelligence operations
and assessments.6

Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline? 7
Certainly the growth of intelligence studies has been remarkable. One
measure is the annual International Studies Association meeting, which in
2014, for example, featured nearly 20 panels focused on all aspects of
intelligence, with representation from U.S. and foreign intelligence services as
well as many university scholars.8 Other practitioner-scholars have also
remarked on the need to move further along the path of professionalization if
analytic performance is to improve. For example, some practitioners have
argued that intelligence analysis, in comparison with medicine and law, is a
nascent profession that will require time to develop key attributes such as a
distinct literature, certification, governing boards, and knowledge
Most progress has been made in analytic tradecraft; see ODNI Intelligence Community
Directive 203, 2 January 2015 (first issued in 2007); also ODNI, ICS 610-7, Oct. 2010.
See also the Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Analytic Standards, April, 2012.
These standards are largely the product of the International Association of Law
Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA), an important new professional
organization. Within the Intelligence Community, the Director of National Intelligence
issues broad Intelligence Community Directives on how agencies should conduct their
activities across a wide array of intelligence functions. These ICDs are published
throughout the community and used by individual agencies as guidance for their own
activities. Mostly accessible as unclassified, they are compilied on the DNI website,
available at: http://www.dni.gov.
6 Stephen Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap between
Scholarship and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 4-5. A related study
addressing private sector competitive intelligence is Craig S. Fleisher, “Are Competitive
Intelligence Practitioners Professionals?” in Craig S. Fleisher and David L. Blenkhorn
(eds.), Controversies in Competitive Intelligence: The Enduring Issues (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2003).
7 See Rebecca Fisher, Rob Johnston, and Peter Clement, “Is Intelligence Analysis a
Discipline?” in George and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, chapter 4.
8 See the International Studies Association website, available at:
http://www.isanet.org/Conferences/Toronto2014/Program.aspx.
5
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management.9 However, professionalization of intelligence analysis entails
more than subject matter expertise, but rather involves good understanding
of the operation and practice of intelligence itself, including the collection
requirements and exploitation process, the epistemology and tradecraft
required for accurate and reliable analysis, and the national security
decisionmaking process which intelligence analysis can ably support—or
entirely miss the mark.
A key premise is that professionalization will improve the quality and
relevance of intelligence. Marrin rightly argues that the lack of
professionalization has resulted in wide variation in analytic competence and
an overall diminution in the role that analysis could play in decisionmaking.10 Studies of intelligence failures also highlight impairments caused
by collection gaps, foreign denial and deception, misinterpretation of
information, and faulty analytic assumptions. Inadequate warning and feeble
or off-target analysis provided to decisionmakers is the result.11 These
sources of intelligence failure often lie at the heart of why policymakers can
feel justified when they disregard or dispute analytic judgments. They also
imply major professional deficiencies in the conduct of analysis. The reported
release of a recent National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan – described
as markedly gloomy in the press – was greeted by some White House officials
as simply “a view,” and not necessarily the determining one.12 This suggests
less than full confidence in the professionalism of intelligence among the
most important users of its products.

Analysis for Decision Advantage
Solid and insightful intelligence analysis can provide support to decisionmaking of national leaders and operators in the field who execute our
diplomatic and military strategies. Decision advantage—that is, the ability to
give the United States an information advantage to enable the use of national
power more quickly and wisely than others—has become even more
important in today’s globalized world of 24/7 communications and
interdependency.13 As intelligence analysts become more proficient in
Fisher, Johnston, and Clement, cited in note 7 above.
Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, p. 132.
11 See George and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, chapter 10.
12 Ernesto Londono, Karen DeYoung, and Greg Miller, “Afghanistan Gains Will be
Quickly Lost After the Drawdown, US Intelligence Warns,” Washington Post, December
28, 2003.
13 See Jennifer Sims, “Decision Advantage and the Nature of Intelligence Analysis,” in the
Oxford Handbook on National Security Intelligence, (ed.) Loch Johnson (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
9
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providing informed judgments and reliable forecasts, they become more
indispensible in directing the smart use of U.S national power. Senior
commanders have come to rely on intelligence analysis as being an integral
part of their understanding the physical as well as virtual battlefields.
Likewise, national level leaders need analysis to comprehend not only the
“facts” as we know them, but also to assess uncertainties of complex
international developments so they can carefully weigh the risks of taking or
rejecting specific actions. Increasingly, as the United States has to make
resource choices on what military strategies and programs to develop, which
diplomatic crises to engage in, or what contingency plans to prepare,
intelligence can help to assess the urgency, signficance, and consequences or
risks those decisions might entail.

Analysis for the 21st Century
Policymakers are likely to become even more reliant on intelligence as their
decisions become more complex, with more second- and third-order
consequences that are harder to foresee. But good analysis will be challenged
by declining resources and growing complexity of the problems that
policymakers will have to face:

Fiscal Constraints
Winston Churchill once said: “We have run out of money, so now we have to
think.” As is evident in recent American fiscal and budgetary crises, we are in
an era when resources will be more constrained than the previous decade of
rapid budget growth. Plans are underway to reduce spending for the coming
years that may jeopardize analysis. The total intelligence budget has
decreased two years in a row, falling four percent overall.14 Additional cuts
will surely continue.
Traditionally, training and outreach efforts are routinely treated as
expendable, rather than reducing other “mission essential” operations.
However, we believe that improved analysis based on more professional
training and education as well as interaction with outside scholars and
experts can be a key force multiplier for reduced U.S. military and foreign
affairs budgets.

14 Pam Benson, “Intelligence Budget Continues to Drop,” CNN Security Blog, October
30, 2012, Testimony of James Clapper Before the Congress, available at:
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/30/intelligence-budget-drops-for-first-timesince-911/.
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Shifting Global Power
Another major challenge facing the United States is the dynamic international
environment. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey
has described the future as an “increasingly competitive environment”
marked by persistent conflict.15 DNI James Clapper’s 2013 worldwide brief to
the congressional oversight committees likewise stressed the unpredictability
of the current environment, and the DNI’s 2014 National Intelligence
Strategy described the security environment as complex and evolving, with
“extremely dangerous, pervasive, and elusive threats.”16 Reinforcing this, the
National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) Global Trends 2030 describes our
future world this way:
“The diffusion of power among countries will have a dramatic impact
by 2030. Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe
combined in terms of global power, based upon GDP, population size,
military spending, and technological investment. China alone will
probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United
States a few years before 2030…. The shift in national power may be
overshadowed by an even more fundamental shift in the nature of
power. Enabled by communications technologies, power will shift
toward multifaceted and amorphous networks that will form to
influence state and global actions. Those countries with some of the
strongest fundamentals—GDP, population size, etc.—will not be able to
punch their weight unless they also learn to operate in networks and
coalitions in a multipolar world.”17
A nation’s learning curve—aided by intelligence—will help establish its place
in the international pecking order, and do much to shape its relative security
amid turbulence. Both the topics and types of analysis will have to shift.

15 Martin Dempsey, Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, February 2012, p.
6, available at:
http://www.public.navy.mil/donhr/Documents/Strategic%20Plans/CJCS%20Strategic
%20Direction%20to%20the%20Joint%20Force.pdf.
16 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper Testimony Before the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee, March 5, 2013; The National Intelligence Strategy
of the United States of America, Sept. 18, 2014, p. 4. Both available at
http://www.dni.gov.
17 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December
2012 (Washington: Director of National Intelligence), Executive Summary, iii.
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Additionally, so-called “wicked problems” such as global climate change,
crisis-driven mass migrations, healthcare, pandemics, nuclear weapons,
human and drug trafficking, and social injustice will become routine
analytical tasks. But their dimensions are poorly defined, nearly impossible
to readily solve without a change in attitudes by affected populations, and
have interdependencies with other critical issues. Such daunting problems as
these will demand higher-order intelligence analysis. Satisfying increasing
intelligence demands cannot be accomplished without greater
professionalization and expertise building over the coming decade.

Analysis and the Metrics of Professions
Attributes of Established Professions
Established or more mature professions such as law and medicine, as well as
others such as engineering, accounting, airline pilots, and career military
service (the “profession of arms”) demonstrate certain attributes that imbue
their practice—the work of their practitioners—as “professional.” Six of the
most important attributes are summarized below.18 They are important for
their heavy integral presence in mature professions, but relative
underdevelopment in intelligence analysis:
1. Governing bodies that set quality standards for
professional performance of their members, for
example, the American Bar Association and American
Medical Association whose members cannot practice
without association membership, or perform at
substandard levels and still retain membership.
2. Rigorous education and continuous training for
practitioners throughout the duration their professional
practice to acquire, sustain, and refine their knowledge
and skills.
3. Certification requirements that limit admission—
that is, prevent their employment—to only those who
qualify, and also levy professional growth requirements

Fisher, Johnston, and Clement identify most of these attributes, which together
constitue a “discipline,” in law, medicine and library services, citing extensive literature
documenting the development of these disciplines, pp. 57-66. Marrin’s half-dozen
attributes of professionalization mostly correspond with ours, but he also includes human
capital management and ethics. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, pp. 134-138.
See also the standard Ernest Greenwood, “Attributes of a Profession,” Social Work 2
(July 1957): 45-55; cited in Lowenthal, in Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, p. 317.
18
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on career practitioners in order to continue their
practice.
4. Knowledge management systems to organize
information in their domains such as West’s Key
Number system for lawyers, the National Library of
Medicine and the Medical Subject Heading index for
MDs, and Dewey’s Decimal System for librarians, and to
facilitate information retrieval and expansion.
5. Systematic, rigorous, and reliable research methods
to build and advance durable knowledge. And
6. Institutionalized lessons-learned or best practices
studies conducted to support continuous organizational
learning.

Assessing Analysis
How well does intelligence analysis stack up when assessed by these
attributes? In general, initial steps are promising, but preliminary and
unsteady. Specifically, while we can see notable progress in the direction of
professsionalization as identified in the attributes of the more mature
professions cited above, it is also clear that intelligence analysis remains some
distance from professional maturity as seen in such professions as law and
medicine. What follows are some notable highlights and shortfalls on the
path to professionalizing analysis:
1. Governing bodies: The ODNI has begun to establish IC-wide standards
in Intelligence Community Directives ICD 203 (analytic standards) and ICD
610 (competencies for professionals), and in Intelligence Community
Standards ICS 610-7 (needed competency standards for analysts). However,
the DNI has no real authority to set or enforce IC-wide standards. In practice,
analysts’ governing bodies are their agency or component management
chains. In general, most agency leadership and management chains seem
discernibly more interested in short-term analytic production than in longerterm development of analytic professionalization. A commited leadership
would have to make professionalization goals specific, and implement metrics
or other measures of effectiveness to assess and monitor progress toward that
goal. Promotion boards would have to include senior trainers or managers
more focused on technique and insight than on production files. An IC-wide
issue, professionalization will require a substantial commitment not only
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within the ODNI, but also from intelligence managers in the agencies, and at
all levels, from first-line managers through the senior ranks.19
2. Training and education: The new National Intelligence University
(NIU) represents a promising start, but little available evidence suggests any
connection between curricular development and analytic professionalization.
To our knowledge, there is little specific “analyst” track of courses with
established standards designed to achieve a specific level of analytic
sophistication. Individual agency-developed training programs vary
enormously in scope, depth, duration, and quality; some agencies support
new analyst training for several months and some shorter mid-career courses
in advanced analysis that qualify analysts for more senior positions, while
other agencies offer almost none or very tailored training that does not
directly support a well-rounded, “complete” analyst. Such professional
development seems at best implicit and ad hoc.
3. Certification: The IC has barely begun in this area. The ODNI could take
the lead in both certification and in developing an analytic governing body at
the IC level, but centralization may be controversial. Some agencies are
entertaining the concept of analyst certification, but rather than having it
done independently, there should be some overall, IC-wide, direction given to
agencies to set and meet some common standards. Entrance to the analytic
cadre, like any other intelligence occupational speciality, requires security
certification. But competency or standards in the performance of analysis are
not yet tested in the IC, and no real certification process beyond routine and
agency-specific periodic performance appraisals affects entrance to or ability
to stay in the analytic ranks.20
4. Knowledge Management: The National Intelligence Library (NLI)
represents a tentative but promising start, but security classification levels
and need-to-know criteria impose daunting limits on information access and
retrieval by analysts. Comprehensive knowledge management in intelligence
The role of management in analysis, especially its professionalization, is central,
understated, and little understood. See John A. Gentry, “Managers of Analysts: The
Other Half of Intelligence Analysis,” Intelligence and National Security, 2014; available
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.961244. See also John C. Gannon,
“Managing Analysis in the Information Age,” in George and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing
Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2008), chapter 13.
20 The International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) has begun an effort
to certify courses and programs in training and education, but not practicing analysts.
See the IAFIE website at: http://www.iafie.org.
19

9
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 3

can never be fully implemented similarly to unclassified disciplines such as
law or medicine, and the Snowden and Manning disclosures highlight the
risks of internal repositories to the insider threat, and make advances more
difficult. Better use of unclassified work by intelligence scholars as well as
additional leeway in reaching out to non-government experts would assist in
having more readily available resources for analysts.
5. Research methods: Major strides in the tradecraft, i.e., methodology, of
intelligence analysis have been made since 2000, especially in the
development and training of structured analytic techniques, and in growing
acceptance of their use in finished intelligence products. The use of tradecraft
groups to support line analysis is also now gaining acceptance in some
agencies, and others have expressed growing interest in this form of
methodological advancement. Still, current training in analytic methods
reflects a largely cookbook approach to practical application (how to do it).
The IC should move toward training programs that develop a deeper
understanding of the epistemological rationale for such tradecraft. It should
also bring into play the power of social and behavioral theories, now largely
absent in intelligence analysis. Such theories can highlight hidden
relationships, generate untested hypotheses, and help connect intelligence
studies with other fields of social and political inquiry in building knowledge
and understanding.21
6. Learning organizations: Organizations must learn just as individuals
do. Lessons-learned to identify best practices (and prevent bad ones) is only
recent to the IC (CIA’s formal effort began only 10 years ago), but this effort
appears to have not yet reached critical mass. It has not yet been
systematically adopted throughout the IC, nor has its potential value even
begun to be realized by agencies. Courses in intelligence successes and
failures have been offered over the years, but any “lessons” are still largely
implicit and applied superficially to analysis, if at all, and are not yet
institutionalized in a way to support learning organizations. Despite the
classified publication of several relevant studies of analytic failures and
successes, few practicing analysts seem aware of lessons learned from such
studies of the successes and failures of their predecessors in their own
agencies much less in others. More importantly, there is little research
See especially the two volume study produced by the National Academy of Sciences,
National Research Council, Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2011); and Baruch Fishhoff and Cherie Chauvin (eds.),
Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2011).
21
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conducted routinely of what “best practices” were employed or should have
been. The fledgling Lessons Learned center at CIA, for example, has focused
far more on operational studies than on analytic ones. In general, the
Community is hard pressed to identify proven “best practices” learned from
past analyses as a guide to improving future analysis. Additionally, periodic
“analytic line reviews” which some agencies have tried in a limited way also
have lessons-learned value for both substantive and methodological
evaluation of a body of analytic reporting on particular topics or issues.

Next Steps in Professionalization
Given the present state of intelligence analysis as briefly characterized here,
and guided by both the attributes of established professions and the notable
gaps they highlight in the emerging profession of analysis, we suggest the
following five recommendations as measures that can help reduce those gaps.
Implementation of the following five recommendations can help appreciably
in advancing the goal of professionalization of intelligence analysis.

Recommendation 1: A Joint Professional Analysis Education (JPAE)
Program
Maximizing the contribution of intelligence analysis to informed national
security policies will demand that a much higher priority be placed on
professionalization than presently exists across the intelligence community.
Not only must current training and education programs be protected from
ongoing budget cuts, but new and better integrated programs will be needed.
Something akin to the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system
of training and certification should be considered as a model for fully
professionalizing the cadre of intelligence analysts.22 Many of the current
programs, and indeed the expansion of the National Intelligence University
campus (and its relocation to Bethesda, proximate to Washington, D.C.),
would lend themselves to such a long-term objective. Unlike the profession of
arms, the profession of analysis has no progressive set of training
requirements through which all future senior analysts must move. It would
be worth considering how the ODNI could develop such a career-long
program of training and education that would both develop individual
analysts’ skills and expertise but also create more of a joint analytic culture.

See Anne Daugherty Miles, "Thinking Holistically: PIE in the Sky?" a 2012 IAFIE
award -winning paper, available at:
http://www.iafie.org/resource/resmgr/2012_essay/miles_2012_iafie.pdf.
22
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Joint Professional Military Education: A Possible Model?
The elaborate system of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is built
around the “profession of arms,” which began as in the early 1800s, with the
establishment of the Military Academy at West Point (1802), the Naval Academy
(1845) and later the Naval War College (1884) and the Army War College (1901). In
the twentieth century it blossomed to include other senior service colleges, along
with specialized command and staff colleges.
As a result of studying the lessons from World Wars I and II, and after considerable
inter-service consideration, the concept of joint education rather than single-service
education took hold. After the Second World War, General Eisenhower and other
wartime flag officers determined that there was a need for advancing senior officers
from all the services to be educated together and develop more interagency
cooperation, and thus, under the auspices of the Joint Staff, the National War
College was founded in Washington D.C. in 1946. Since then, the JPME programs
have expanded well beyond military officers to include senior civilians in the
national security enterprise as well as senior officers from foreign militaries. Many
have become fully accredited degree-granting institutions.
The military leadership has recognized the need to develop professional military
skills throughout an officer’s career, from basic training courses to specialized
disciplines (infantry, artillery, air, naval, amphibious, and other operational
specialties) and ultimately to senior-level education that prepares officers for
national-level responsibilities. At the earlier stages of an officer’s career, “skills”
training is emphasized; however, as the officer is promoted, the JPME objectives
shift to “educating” the officer into the art of national security strategy development,
interagency cooperation, and multinational operations. These steps in the JPME
ladder are considered prerequisites for promotion to higher commands and
ultimately to national-level decision-making. Indeed, the Goldwater Nichols
Military Reform Act of 1986 makes joint professional military education a statutory
requirement for promotion to flag-officer rank.
In the course of a 20-year career, an officer can minimally assume two-to-three
years’ full-time equivalent of training and education, often more. At particular
ranks, they undergo specified types of training and education, typically required for
further advancement. To be considered for promotion to General or Admiral,
officers must move out of the field to gain an understanding of the broader national
security context in which their missions have to be performed, as well as to
comprehend the roles and missions of other civilian departments and agencies with
which they will have to work. The stress on “jointness” – especially since the
Goldwater-Nichols reforms – has become accepted practice, with other civilian
agencies also recognizing the importance of their senior officers gaining joint duty
experiences on the way to executive-level positions of responsibility.
Source: Cynthia Watson, Military Education: A Reference Handbook, 2007
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In “jointness,” we advocate a common understanding of the analytic
profession, its attributes, and its standards across the entire IC, analogous to
the earlier impact of Goldwater-Nichols on the military services and the
specific intent of IRTPA—not force a homogenization of all analysts that
removes the unique skills and work practices required for different agencies.
Such a JPAE system need not slavishly copy all aspects of the joint
professional military education system, but it should strive to integrate the
varous training programs directed by individual agencies and establish some
common standards for the training each agency gives its analysts.
Accordingly, as analysts progress through their careers, different training and
education goals could be set; at various points in their careers they would be
assigned to complete those programs in order to advance further in their
chosen analytic track.
For example, an analyst entering on duty might be expected to take a basic
analysis course, offered by an individual agency or, if not available there, then
by the ODNI. Having completed this entry-level basic training, the analyst
might then work on an account for a period of time, before next being
expected to take additional full-time training. We believe there are several
areas, where additional training might be considered, which we touch on
briefly:
Basic Understanding of Epistemology. Knowledge-building requires that
analysts understand the basis for what constitutes reliable knowledge or
information.23 Postmortems of intelligence failures—highlighted most
recently by the 2002 Iraq WMD NIE—demonstrate that analysts often rely
too heavily on unsubstantiated information, merely because it came from
what had been thought to be either authoritative sources or because it fit a
current mind-set. Likewise analysts’ judgments can be swayed by the
authority of their more senior managers or the organization’s current
assessment of a problem (the “analytical line”), without considering whether
such judgments are based on something more empirically or scientifically
based. Too few analysts have been schooled in the nature of knowledge or
think about the basis on which they are reaching conclusions. Hence,
concerted attention to basic epistemology that underpins the analytic
profession should be a foundational element of every analyst’s training.

See James B. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to
Intelligence,” in George and Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, pp. 135-155.
23
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Science-based analysis. As part of this training, analysts should be exposed
to the power of a more science-based production of knowledge. The only
proven method of correcting errors in judgment is one which relies on
hypothesis testing, validation of information, transparency, and peer review.
Such features afford science uniquely self-correcting techniques. The trend
toward using Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) can not only improve
relibility of analysis, but also accelerate the analytic profession’s advancement
to becoming a true discipline. Hand-in-hand with a basic understanding of
epistemology, the further development of an accessible repository of
organized, searchable, and retrievable information will facilitate a more
complete and reliable knowledge-base from which lessons can be learned by
future generations of analysts.24
Analysis and Collection Disciplines. A vital area for analyst training will
provide a deeper understanding of the collection sources on which
intelligence judgments rest. As suggested above, too few analysts truly
understand how they know what they know. Most are limited by inadequate
understanding of the methods underlying HUMINT, SIGINT, and GEOINT.
Too few analysts invest the time needed to grasp the complexities of these
disciplines or appreciate the strengths, weaknesses, or biases that such
information sources bring to the analytic process. More analysts should
spend time working with the major collection agencies. Additionally, training
is needed on how collection systems work, how analysts can best use them,
and how much confidence to place in the raw intelligence reporting that each
produces.
Basic Warning Training. Numerous investigations and postmortems have
highlighted the classic intelligence warning failures that analysts have
encountered. Yet training and education on warning has not kept pace with
the expanding scope of warning problems, nor the recent decentralization in
how the warning function is conducted. Too few analysts understand warning
as a principal responsibility, nor understand the warning process and perils
detailed in the many studies conducted on intelligence failures. At a
minimum, basic analytic training should include a focus on the warning
function, greater understanding of how adversaries might employ denial and

This progress will, however, be slowed by the lack of a developed taxonomy of
intelligence topics and the multiple layers of classification and clearance requirements
that are part of a “need to know” intelligence culture. More efforts on these fronts will
also be needed.

24
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deception, and best practices for communicating warning to the broader
intelligence community and policymakers.
Expertise-building. Another step in an analyst’s career-long training should
be expertise-building, clearly an important theme in DCIA Brennan’s
proposed reorrganization emphasizing Mission Centers. Fewer analysts today
are hired at the Ph.D. level, though most have had some courses on their
regional, country, or functional accounts as part of undergraduate or master’s
level education. Some agencies currently offer time-off or tuitionreimbursement for master’s level graduate studies. This approach is
haphazard and does not build expertise in a systematic or planned way. A
more regulated educational program of subject matter expertise would expose
analysts to new analytic methods as well as to leading experts in their fields
outside the intelligence community.
Senior Service College Experience. A final step in the JPAE might then be
participation in a year-long CAPSTONE-style course at a senior service
college, or at an NIU-equivalent program for rising senior analysts. These
programs are “joint” by their very nature, as they bring together mid-career
military and civilian officers from services, the national security agencies, and
the intelligence community, whose parent agencies expect might become
future leaders of their instituions. This year-long exposure to the “whole-ofgovernment” system would give intelligence analysts an entirely different
perspective on how they can best serve warriors, diplomats, and law
enforcement officials as well as the NSC and other very senior customers. An
NIU-equivalent program bringing together officers from across the IC would
have the benefit of creating a more common culture and networks of senior
officers now more prepared to work collaboratively.25

Recommendation 2: Standardize and Test Analytic Methods
Were a JPAE to be established, it would also need to establish a more uniform
and recognized set of training objectives for all analysts. One of the key
attributes of the analytic profession is “how we do our work.” Analytic
methods, techniques, and skills are often what set analysts apart from subject
In the military system, a CAPSTONE course is offered to those officers selected as flagofficers, who will need to understand higher-level strategy and will be operating at the
national-level. The course is of shorter duration (roughly six weeks) than longer-full time
service college programs, is led by serving and former three-star officers, and each class is
much smaller, facilitating more of a seminar-style of learning. The State Department
once had a similar program, called the Senior Seminar, which drew in promising senior
foreign services officers as well as select officers from the intelligence community and the
military.
25
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matter experts outside the intelligence community. Many structured analytic
techniques already exist26 and they should become more utilized across the
intelligence community. Structured analytic techniques have also been
developed for tactical-level military applictions.27 This is happening—slowly
and unevenly—but it could be further encouraged if the ODNI were to go
beyond the community-wide standards now in ICD 203 by further developing
structured analytic tradecraft curricular materials, and courses for those
agencies not able to support their own analysis training. Workshops in using
specific techniques should be ongoing, with the development of case studies
on specific examples of how a Structured Analytic Technique (SAT) was used,
with what success—or failure—and why. Building up a body of SAT case
studies would not only be a good training tool, but it would also permit more
evaluation of the techniques themselves. Indeed, one of the current
weaknesses of using SATs is that there is almost no research on whether these
techniques result is more accurate judgments and forecasts, or even more
insightfiul or useful analysis.28 It should, therefore, be the goal of the ODNI
to support more research into effective analytic methods, more
documentation of their utility and limitations, and consideration of how to
further expand the set of analytic methods used by analysts.

Recommendation 3: A More Robust Lessons-Learned Capability
The currently modest Lessons Learned capability that CIA and the DNI have
developed at CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, along with DIA’s
similar Knowledge Laboratory, have not been widely emulated elsewhere in
the IC. And none has the stature of the lessons-learned organizations in the
military. It is our distinct impression that this emerging capability has been
hugely underutilized for learning about and improving analysis. Thus, there
would seem to be ample opportunities for a “Lessons Learned” library of
analytic cases.29 Case study writers could be assigned to an analytic team
focused on a particular analytic challenge. The case writers would observe the
analytic process from beginning to end, noting how the analysts collaborated,
what analytic methods they employed, how they reached judgments, and
See Richards J. Heuer, Jr., and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques
for Intelligence Analysis 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2015); and their related
chapter in George and Bruce (eds), Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, pp. 231-248.
27 See Stewart, Cukor, Larson, and Pottinger, in George and Bruce (eds.), Analyzing
Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, chapter 15.
28 See Marrin, Ibid, pp. 24. A forthcoming study by the RAND Corporation identifies
arguments for and against the use of SATs and acknowledges the difficulty of validating
them. Based on a pilot study, its prelimimary assessment generally finds that improved
analysis can result from their use.
29 See Sarah Miller Beebe and Randolph H. Pherson, Cases in Intelligence Analysis:
Structured Analytic Techniques in Action, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2014).
26
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finally how they delivered their findings to policymakers. They could also
follow-up and record the analytic effort’s accuracy and impact, and also
collect whatever feedback policymakers might be willing to provide. This
would be far superior to the past attempts to “evaluate” the quality of a
product’s analytic tradecraft after the fact, or solicit policymakers’ general
satisfaction levels with analytic support anecdotally and typically long after
the policymaker has forgotten a specific analytical product.30

Recommendation 4: A New Journal for Intelligence Analysis
Few true professions exist in the absence of true professional journals. New
findings, new research techniques, or controversial issues can be aired within
a community of practice. Such could exist for the intelligence community as
well. The ODNI has made good strides in developing more community-wide
data bases of analysis and enabling greater collaboration among analysts
across the community. The technology available today makes this much
easier both to share as well as retrieve analytic products remotely across both
time and distance. The I-Space and Library of National Intelligence analysis
are two such examples of what is now possible. No doubt there can be
additional such initiatives that further exploit technology to improve these
data bases and make them more user-friendly to a larger number of analysts.
Where the intelligence community might devote more attention, however, is
in the development of a true “peer review” journal of analytic practices.
Sherman Kent spoke of this more than 50 years ago. The closest that the CIA
and intelligence community have come to this is the Center for the Study of
Intelligence’s Studies in Intelligence. This quarterly journal, long published
in both classified and unclassified issues, has been the principal journal of
record of what the CIA and other agencies have learned from their operations
and analysis. Owing to its largely military interests and readership, the
American Intelligence Journal, somewhat like the no-longer-published
Defense Intelligence Journal, is likely to remain, at least for a while, a less
well-known or cited publication. Outside the IC, there are two relevant
academic journals that publish articles on a full range of intelligence topics, to
include historical cases of operations, analytic issues, historical topics, and
intelligence-policy challenges, namely the refereed Intelligence and National
A notable exception to this “after-the-fact” feedback, is the way PDB briefers daily
present intelligence analysis and get new taskings as well as comments on those PDB
items. This instant feedback is of course valuable, but seldom can put the contribution of
such analysis into a broader context of ongoing support on a particular issue, which is
what a case study might do more systematically.
30
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Security and the International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.
While these publications are important to the general field of intelligence,
none is fully devoted to the study of analytic methods and practices. Such a
journal can become a vehicle for exchanging views on the utility of different
forms and methods of analysis, on new analytic challenges, or on important
analytic findings and their implications for the intelligence community. This
“Journal of Intelligence Analysis” could fill a gap that presently exists,
becoming the discussion board for analysts who might take different positions
on the utility of certain SATs, or have minority views regarding analytic
judgments reached by most intelligence analysts or agencies. The periodic
complaint that not enough research has been conducted on the effectiveness
of SATs might be better addressed if such a journal were established to
encourage analysts to share their own experiences using these methods.
Most logically, such a journal could become part of the newly expanding
National Intelligence University. Like the National Defense University which
produces a variety of publications, including the Joint Forces Quarterly, NIU
might direct its own academic press to support journals dedicated to analysis
and possibly other fields of specialization. It could be a refereed journal
published in hard copy and available on-line, and include blog-like
discussions of analytic issues. Additionally, any classified studies that may
address how analytic failures can be averted and successes achieved might be
declassified to facilitate a wider circulation among uncleared researchers not
in the IC whose “outsider” perspectives could bring value to the discussions.
Like the current Studies in Intelligence, there would be value in producing
unclassified issues in order to expose analysts’ views to outside examination
and commentary and, fostering outreach, to invite non-official participants
into discussions of analysis. One continuing problem for analysis is its
insularity owing principally to classification. Having more contact—another
form of analytic outreach—with outside experts in both methodology as well
as substantive expertise would be a desirable objective of such a journal. It
would also support a number of university programs in intelligence studies
which are eager to improve their curricula and make their courses more
relevant to students aspiring to become intelligence analysts.
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Recomnmendation 5: Establish Analyst Entry and Certification
Processes
Intelligence analysis is an odd profession as it has historically not been
one of those “callings” for which students in college take preprofessional
(such as pre-law or pre-med) training. Across the country a wide range
of courses is offered at both undergraduate and graduate levels on
intelligence and analysis. While such offerings fall short of established
professional degree programs, IC analysts can still augment their
internal training and professional growth through select university
curricular opportunities, especially at the graduate level.31 This
“accidental” profession – as one colleague has described it32—could
benefit if it became more purposeful earlier in an analyst’s career
development, including in the entry-level requirements as well as the
standards one must maintain during in one’s career. Given the broad
scope of occupational disciplines within professional analysis—military,
political, economic, S&T, leadership, and now targetting, to speak of the
broader categories—the notion of a single set of preprofessional
educational requirements for an incoming analyst is perhaps too
narrow.
A successful WMD analyst, for example, might have entered with a degree in
chemistry, biology, or even political science depending on which aspects of
WMD he or she might be following. However, any analyst expecting to focus
on the foreign policy aspects of even a functional issue like WMD should be
able to demonstrate an interest, if not a specialization, in national security
affairs, foreign countries and languages. So, developing a profile of an
applicant who might mature into a successful analyst could include not only
their proficiency in their own academic discipline, but also in their general
knowledge of the world and their analytic skills.33 Individual agencies now
require online applications, possibly writing samples, and documentation of

The International Association For Intelligence Education (IAFIE, cited in note 20) was
formed in 2004 bringing together several hundred scholars, practitioners and teachers of
intelligence analysis. They represent colleges and universities whose offerings range from
a single course on intelligence to a “minor” or “certificate” in intelligence studies.
Analysis is often addressed in these programs.
32 See Lowenthal, “The Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts,” in George and
Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, pp. 304.
33 To get the right blend of general world affairs knowledge on top of an area
specialization, agencies might consider a general “entrance exam” along the lines of the
type currently used by the U.S. Foreign Service.
31
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applicants’ experience or skills that are appropriate to the analytic profession
could support professionalization objectives.
As mentioned above, few entry-level analysts are true “experts” in their fields
when they are hired since they are neophytes in the discipline and still have
much to learn. Thus, agencies need to know if such applicants have the
capacity to deepen their expertise and have sufficient intellectual curiousity
and drive that will ensure their success in the future. Some way of measuring
such characteristics would be useful.34 Similar to the Foreign Service,
applicants might be asked to take a standardized test to see what prospective
analysts know about the world; this might be used in conjunction with any
specific academic discipline that they would bring to intelligence analysis.
Furthermore, the entrance exam could include questions regarding their
research and work styles to give recruiters a better feel for their abilities to
conduct research and collaborate in analytic teams.
Testing analysts, once hired, has never really been part of the analytic culture.
On-the-job training through “doing analysis” and being observed and
evaluated by peers and supervisors has been the sole measure of whether an
analyst is progressing in his or her development. This “trial” or
“probationary” period of time is used to determine if an analyst has what it
takes, but is often fairly subjective. Likewise, many training courses offered
by intelligence agencies are still non-graded. That is to say, the analysts
typically pass by merely showing up and signing in. There is little effort to
determine whether they have learned anything. A more empirical basis for
evaluating analysts’ proficiency in conducting analysis is now in order.
A first step is to adopt, as military service colleges and military intelligence
curricula do, training programs that include evaluation standards. Some have
letter grades, while others adopt the philosophy that a student has “met” the
standards expected or was “above” or “below” them. Constructing course
evaluation standards, which would be included in an analyst’s annual fitness
report, would incentivize more engagement in training and education
opportunities as well as give supervisors a stronger basis for promoting or not
One study identifies core competencies for intelligence analysts in four areas: abilities,
characteristics, knowledge, and skills. See David Moore and Lisa Krizan, “Core
Competencies for Intelligence Analysts at at the National Security Agency,” in Russell
Swenson (ed.), Bringing Intellignce About: Adding Value to Information in the U.S.
Intelligence Community (Washington DC, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002), pp.
81-113; cited in Mark Lowenthal, “The Education and Training of Analysts,” in Analyzing
Intelligence, 2nd ed., 2014, p. 307.
34
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promoting analysts. In skills-based training, there should be a way to
measure whether an analyst can actually employ an analytic technique or not;
similarly, in more seminar-style courses or simulations, instructors should be
able to evalute how well or poorly an analyst contributes, collaborates, and
leads in a group setting.
Whatever system of standards is adopted, it should be tied directly to the
kinds of tasks analysts are likely to face, and those standards should then
drive the development of curricula. Some intelligence analysis schools believe
they achieve this by sending “seasoned” analysts to become instructors in
their basic analyst courses. However, such analysts may not necessarily be
the best teachers, even if they have come from the analytic front lines.
Instead, intelligence schools and the NIU should be looking for instructors
who have had practical analytical experience but also who are both interested
and talented in instructing.
Once a set of standards in both training as well as in analytic performance is
well established, a certification program will become more achievable and
acceptable. Without micro-managing every agency, the ODNI should be able
to articulate basic, journeyman, and senior analyst skill levels, which are also
tied to the completion of a comparable set of training and education courses
as well as to a production history that reflects progressively more
sophisticated understanding of intelligence analysis in the analyst’s
occupational discipline. To this we add policy and operational impact when
the analyst reaches that level.

Conclusions: Analysis and Policy
The foregoing discussion has suggested that professionalizing analysis will
advance proficiency, expertise, and ultimately the quality of the analysis we
provide to policymakers. Good analysts will have a “prepared mind” to deal
with their own cognitive biases, and also pierce the shroud of secrecy and
deception which adversaries use to obscure or distort their intentions and
capabilities. Preparing both analysts and their organizations to overcome
these hurdles to good analysis is the best way to avert new strategic surprises
and intelligence failures, and better serve intelligence customers. Since 2001
the United States has not suffered another attack on a scale of 9/11, or an
intelligence blunder on the scale of the 2002 Iraq WMD NIE. But there is no
guarantee that such events could not occur tomorrow. While most
policymakers will take little interest in how the intelligence community
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prepares itself today, they will most certainly hold analysts and agencies
accountable for tomorrow’s surprises.
Among the obstacles that face the recommendations urged here, two are
prominent: Scarce resources, and organizational cultures which do not fully
embrace the more rigorous training and education vital to professionalization.
In the first case, budget cuts historically fall hardest on those elements
deemed less critical or immediate. Perhaps inevitably, training and education
throughout the U.S government—and most assuredly in intelligence—is
usually an early victim of downturns in agency budgets, and any monies for
new training programs are also slashed in favor of higher priority projects
deemed to satisfy immediate needs or have greater visibility with
policymakers. Unlike the military services that steadily assign a sizable
proportion of their forces to training and education no matter the spikes in
manpower demands, intelligence agencies typically view training as a
nuisance or distraction rather than an investment in professionalization. In
the IC, analysts often cannot be spared for training when they are in short
supply relative to perceived insatiable consumer demands for greater
production. This subordination of training and education to putative higher
priorities is partly explained by organizational cultures which have not
traditionally valued education.
Since most analysts come to their jobs with some subject matter expertise,
managers often presume they will learn whatever else they need “on the job”
just as they did. On-the-job training throughout the IC historically trumps
formal training and education both inside and outside the IC. This cultural
bias reinforces a sense that training and education is properly a secondary
priority. Moreover, agencies’ perennial insularity from academe fosters poor
understanding about educational opportunities to improve such professional
skills as critical thinking and even subject matter expertise. Both of these
hurdles, resource competition and cultural resistance, will need to be
overcome if the professionalization of analysis is to advance.
In the end, the measure of the analytic profession’s performance is assessed
by how its results are received and used. We hasten to suggest that without
further professionalization the intelligence community is more at the mercy of
partisan and bureaucratic politics, which can increase the misuse and
misrepresentation of intelligence analysis. The intelligence controversies
swirling around the 9/11 attacks and the 2002 Iraq WMD estimate painfully
remind us how blame for policy failures can be left at the doorstep of
intelligence analysts when their professional skills have been found wanting.
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In concert with demonstrated competence levels in the more mature
professions such as medicine is the adoption of a code of ethics.35 Intelligence
analysis needs such a code, not only to ensure the integrity and cognitive
neutrality of analysis, but also to help shield analysts from later accusations
when they’ve done their professional level best to deliver accurate, reliable,
and objective results, no matter the policy stakes involved.
While intelligence failures are sure to happen, the development of more
professional skills, and standards of conduct that go with them, will mitigate
the chances that poor analytic tradecraft or lapses in integrity will be at the
center of those future controversies. As one scholar has put it, politicization
of intelligence is most likely to occur when intelligence is important to
national security policies.36 It is a safe bet that U.S. intelligence analysis on
the current pressing issues apart from terrorism—e.g., Iran’s nuclear
program, along with that of North Korea, or the mess in Syria, the Middle
East, and indeed, political unrest in any number of key countries—will also
remain important and sometimes controversial as those judgments will be
based on limited information and shrouded in the secrecy and deception used
by such states. Often assessments must rest on important assumptions that
analysts are required to make about those foreign actors and their activities.
The more transparent, rigorous, and open-minded analysts can be with
policymakers about the limitations of their knowledge and insight, the better
informed will be U.S. decisions and associated risks regarding those
programs.
Similarly, the rise of China—potentially America’s next peer economic, if not
military, rival—will bedevil U.S. strategists, making them frustrated at times
with the limits of what we can know about Beijing’s intentions and
capabilities. Most likely, the debate over China is going to heat up, placing
intelligence at the center of those debates over the proper U.S. response
(containment, engagement, or something inbetween). Thus, adopting the
highest professional standards for analysis, maintaining analytic integrity,
and being as candidly self-critical of our performance as our critics can
sometimes be will help safeguard the intelligence community’s credibility
with the American public and future administrations. The future is too
uncertain and too important to expect anything less from our intelligence
community.
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